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The distribution of wealth among the members of a society is herein assumed to result from
two fundamental mechanisms, trade and investment. An empirical distribution of wealth shows an
abrupt change between the low-medium range, that may be fitted by a non-monotonic function
with an exponential-like tail such as a Gamma distribution, and the high wealth range, that
is well fitted by a Pareto or inverse power-law function. We demonstrate that an appropriate
trade-investment model, depending on three adjustable parameters associated with the total wealth
of a society, a social differentiation among agents, and economic volatility referred to as investment
can successfully reproduce the distribution of empirical wealth data in the low, medium and high
ranges. Finally, we provide an economic interpretation of the mechanisms in the model and, in
particular, we discuss the difference between Classical and Neoclassical theories regarding the
concepts of value and price. We consider the importance that out-of-equilibrium trade transactions,
where the prices differ from values, have in real economic societies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we attempt to replicate the empirical dis-
tribution of wealth using a parsimonious model in which
there are two ways by which wealth can be accumulated:
by investment and by trading. By investment we intend
any act that creates or destroys wealth, whereas by trade
we intend any type of economic transaction. While a ba-
sic investment mechanism can be modeled with a stochas-
tic multiplicative model [1], herein we focus on a basic
nonlinear stochastic trade mechanism that captures the
following properties: a) in trades there may be a transfer
of wealth from one agent to the other because the price
paid fluctuates around an equilibrium price (=value) and,
therefore, the price may differ from the value of the com-
modity transferred; b) in a trade transaction the amount
of wealth that may move from one agent to the other is
bounded because the price and the value of a commodity
cannot (usually) exceed the wealth of the poorer of the
two traders; c) the price is socially determined in such a
way that the trade is statistically biased in favor of the
poorer trader. These properties imply an intrinsic non-
linear stochasticity and can not be captured by linear
econophysics models such as one based on a mean field
approximation [1], or on a kinetic theory approximation
[2]. We refer to our model as the nonlinear stochastic
trade-investment model (NSTIM).
There is a difference between the price paid for and the
value of the commodity transferred in a trade. This dif-
ference is the basis of NSTIM and requires an economic
explanation. In fact, the concept of a divergence be-
tween price and value is foreign to Neoclassical economic
theory, which assumes that all trades occur in “equilib-
rium” [3] where price and value are equal. This economic
assumption is summarized in the so-called “Law of one
price” [4]. Neoclassic economists do not expect trade to
involve a transfer of wealth, but rather an increase in
utility for both parties with a zero net transfer of wealth.
This balance was formalized into the controversial “Say’s
Principle” [5]. While the concepts of price and value have
effectively been melded in Neoclassical theory, its prede-
cessor, the Classical school of thought, maintained a dis-
tinction. Value reflected the long-term cost of production
of a commodity in Classical economics, whereas price was
what was paid in the market on any particular day. The
Classical economists expected divergences to occur reg-
ularly, though they also expected that there would be
a tendency for market price to converge towards value
over time. We observe that the familiar expectation that
a more modern theory is better than an older one may
not be true in economics, where conventional neoclassi-
cal concepts, theories, and methodologies are still being
criticized [6].
To physicists, given the dynamics of real economic in-
teractions and the many social and political forces that
impinge on economic interactions, the argument that ac-
tual trades occur in equilibrium and are market clear-
ing appears strange. We expect that trades will usually
be out-of-equilibrium, that is, price ought to differ from
value, and the existence of fluctuating levels of stocks of
all kinds of unsold goods is manifest proof that real prices
are not “market clearing”. Data show that the so-called
“Law of one price” is never fulfilled because the market
price does not converge towards value even after several
centuries [7]. Wealth transfer should therefore always oc-
cur in real trades because it is possible to buy or sell a
2commodity for a price that may be higher or lower than
its value around which actual transaction prices fluctu-
ate.
Moreover, the total amount of wealth that can be
transferred in trades from one agent to the other should
be constrained by the total amount of wealth of the
poorer trader because a trader cannot (usually) afford
to buy or sell a commodity whose value or price is larger
than his/her own total wealth. The interesting finding
we reach is that because of the above constraint, the
richer agent always risks less than does the poorer agent
in trades. Therefore, if there is an equal probability to
make a “good deal” for both the richer and poorer traders,
that is, we assume that all possible outcomes within the
wealth bound are equally likely, the overall effect is that
the entire wealth of a society will eventually concentrate
through successive random trades into the hands of the
rich; this is a classical statistical problem known as the
gambler’s ruin [8]. This may explain why it is easier for
the rich to get richer and the poor to get poorer over
time, than is the reverse. Of course, in real societies a
situation in which the entire wealth concentrates in the
hands of very few people will cause an economic insta-
bility resulting in a social catastrophe. A stable society
requires that the middle class be the largest.
Indeed, real wealth and income distributions show that
the middle class is the largest. The income distributions,
p (w), for very large w, almost 1% of the population (the
rich class), satisfy an inverse power law (IPL) of the form
lim
w→∞
p(w) ∝ 1
wµ+1
, (1)
where, µ is the IPL index (note that µ is known as
Pareto’s exponent [9], of the cumulative distribution
P (w) =
∫∞
w
p(x)dx ∝ w−µ). Instead, for the low to
middle level of wealth, almost 99% of the population,
the wealth distributions present a different shape. The
distribution curve is non-monotonic and, therefore, there
is a large middle class and a smaller poor class. Wealth
or income distributions at the low-middle range may be
well fitted, for example, by a Gamma distribution,
lim
w←∞
p(w) ∝ wη exp[−d w], (2)
where η and d are appropriate parameters. Figure 1
shows some phenomenological distributions and cumula-
tive distributions of wealth and income for the United
Kingdom and the United States [10]. The change of
properties between low-middle (gamma-distribution) and
high wealth (Pareto’s law) ranges is typical of these dis-
tribution [11, 12, 13].
The social economic catastrophe related to the gam-
bler’s ruin problem can be avoided by assuming a sys-
tematic and effectively permanent stochastic bias in trade
that favors the poorer trader. This pro-poor bias would
move wealth from rich to poor and reproduce the above
socially safer Gamma-like distribution with a large mid-
dle class and a smaller poor class. We observe that social
mechanisms such as the graduated income tax and luxury
tax policies are statistically biased in favor of the poor
and may play significant roles in moving wealth from
rich to poor. In addition, because the main trade that
poor to middle wealth individuals make is of their labor
services in return for a wage, we suggest that the wage
tends to stochastically exceed the value of labor. Even if
a reader may initially be surprised by our argument that
workers’ wages should be higher than the value of their
labor, we recall that this phenomenon was also observed
by Karl Marx. In his complete analysis Marx made clear
that the wages would normally exceed the value of labor-
power [14, 15, 16] because “The natural price of labor
is nothing but the minimum wage” (p. 55 in Ref. [14]),
which is a subsistence payment. Indeed, there should be
an economic bias in favor of the workers because workers
do not receive only a subsistence payment and, therefore,
the wage “price” should normally exceed wage “value”!
In fact, the wage “price” is not simply the product of
the labor itself but also depends on other factors such
as, for example, the social and political necessity of sta-
bilizing and favoring the entire society. Moreover, for
example, the capitalists would have to pay a kind of “so-
cial peace” component to avoid strikes because workers
might not be satisfied to receive only a subsistence pay-
ment. The main means for getting a wage higher than
a subsistence payment is given by the strength of the
poor and middle classes that are much larger and, in
particular in modern democracies, politically more influ-
ential than the very small rich class. The social, political
and psychological effect of the higher economic risk in
which the low-middle classes live, due to their economic
resources that are more restricted than those of the rich,
is probably what ultimately determines that real prices
and wages are forced to be in an out-of-equilibrium state
that favors the poor-middle classes.
The NSTIM developed herein attempts to simply
model the above properties. The paper has the follow-
ing structure. In Section II we present some historical
background and indicate what is to be expected from a
model based on complex system theory. In Section III
we introduce the nonlinear stochastic model schematiz-
ing the mechanisms of trade and investment, presumed to
underlie the allocation of wealth within a society. In Sec-
tion IV we proceed to analyze the NSTIM by computer
simulations, under varying assumptions for the interven-
ing parameters. In Section V the model is shown to be
capable, not only of yielding outcomes which compare
favorably with actual data, but it also sheds some light
on the economic basis for certain overall features of the
data. Finally, in Section 6 we present a detailed discus-
sion of the meaning, in an economic context, of the terms
appearing in the model, and then venture to draw some
conclusions on the implications of the foregoing consid-
erations for the welfare of human societies.
3II. SOME HISTORICAL OBSERVATIONS AND
ASSET EXCHANGE LINEAR MODELS
It is straightforward to determine that while income
and wealth distributions look qualitatively similar (see
Figure 1), they do not coincide because income and
wealth are not the same quantity.
The Oxford Dictionary of Economics [17] defines wealth
as “the total value of a person’s net assets, such as,
money, shares in companies, debt instruments, land,
buildings, intellectual property such as patents and copy-
rights, and valuables such as works of art. From this any
debts owed are subtracted.” The same source proceeds to
indicate that “the valuation put on these things is liable
to uncertainty and fluctuations, as many of the assets
are not marketed, and those that are may have volatile
market prices.” The latter aspect will turn out to play
a crucial role in the model. In more quantitative terms
a wealth distribution can be obtained by using the data
of all assets and liabilities of a person that must be re-
ported at his or her death for the purpose of inheritance
tax as Dra˘gulescu and Yakovenko [12] did for estimating
the wealth distribution of United Kingdom. On the other
hand, income is defined as the amount of money or its
equivalent received during a period of time in exchange
for labor or services, from the sale of goods or property,
or as profit from financial investments. An income dis-
tribution is obtained by using data reported each year to
the state for income tax purposes [12]. Intuitively, it ap-
pears that wealth and income must be somehow related;
the variables wealth, income and, we add, consumption
are known, in a society of interacting agents, to affect
each other in a highly non-trivial manner, through com-
plicated feedback loops, partly described by the economic
concepts of ‘wealth effect’ and ‘income effect’ [17, 18].
Both wealth and income have a long history of being
studied as quantitative indicators of the economic status
of a society, at least since the classic work of Vilfredo
Pareto [9], in which he proposed that the cumulative dis-
tribution of the rather sparse income data pertaining to
a number of societies, available to him, could be fitted by
an IPL [19]. With far better data, both in terms of quan-
tity and quality, being available to later researchers, it is
now fairly evident that income distributions have a more
complicated structure, reasonably well described by IPLs
only in the uppermost bracket [20]. There appears to be a
consensus among various scientists [1, 12, 21, 22] that the
cumulative distribution of wealth, for the very wealthi-
est, also exhibits an IPL form, while the data pertaining
to other social strata are less certain. An empirical PDF
of wealth increases in the low range, reaches a maximum
at middle range and, finally decreases as an IPL at high
values of wealth [10, 12].
Economists have long sought to devise theoretical mod-
els that could reproduce empirical wealth data or, even
more ambitiously, that could ‘predict’ how the distribu-
tion of wealth in a society would respond to changing
conditions. None of the existing models are considered
entirely satisfactory [23]. Such efforts have been frus-
trated by the previously lamented difficulty in obtaining
unequivocal data, especially for the less wealthy [24, 25],
but also, we believe, by an approach to the problem that
tends to identify and incorporate a large array of factors
that are believed to affect the dynamics of wealth [23].
Framed in such reductionistic terms, the problem clearly
becomes extremely complicated.
An alternative to a direct modeling of all the variables
in a system emerges from a strategy for modeling complex
systems [26]. The main challenge is to extract the essence
of what appears to be a forbiddingly complicated behav-
ior. In analogy with statistical mechanics, a number of
authors have sought to derive wealth distributions as the
steady-state solutions of differential equations consisting
of a stochastic term (investment) and an interaction term
(trade) [1, 21, 27, 28, 29]. In these models an individ-
ual’s wealth may change in time either, a) because the
valuation of wealth is “liable to uncertainty and fluctu-
ations”, or b) because wealth may be exchanged among
members of a society. Consequently, we refer to (a) as in-
vestment and (b) as trade, although such terms can also
be used in a broader sense in these models. A common
trait shared by such models is that the effect of invest-
ment is incorporated through a stochastic multiplicative
process term, which is known to yield solutions with in-
verse power-law behavior [1, 29, 30]. Differences arise,
however, in the interaction terms describing the effect of
trade [1, 31, 32].
A linear model proposed by Bouchaud and Mezard [1],
used also by other authors [21, 27, 28] was borrowed from
the physics of directed polymers and describes the dy-
namics of the wealth Wi(t) of the agent i in an ideal
society of N agents as given by
dWi
dt
= ηi(t) Wi +
N∑
j=1( 6=i)
Jij Wj −
N∑
j=1( 6=i)
Jji Wi . (3)
The component ηi(t)Wi is a Gaussian multiplicative pro-
cess with variance σ that simulates the investment dy-
namics. The two sum terms of Eq. (3) describe the
trade interaction network between the agent i and all
other agents in the society and Jij is the linear exchange
rate between agents i and j. This model is solvable in the
mean field approximation that implies that Jij = J/N
and yields
dWi
dt
= ηi(t) Wi + J(W −Wi) , (4)
where W = N−1
∑
iWi is the mean wealth and J is the
mean field coefficient. The mean-field approximation is
useful because Eq. (4) can be associated with a solvable
Fokker-Planck equation with the following equilibrium
pdf solution peq(w) = Ψ exp
[
1−µ
w
]
1
w1+µ , where Ψ =
(µ− 1)µ/Γ[µ] is the normalization constant and µ = 1+
J/σ2 is the Pareto exponent [1].
However, despite the elegance of yielding a solvable
equation with a solution that succeeds in reproducing a
4Pareto tail, we believe that the mean-field approxima-
tion obscures any aspect of a realistic trade process. In
fact, this approximation implies that in a trade the agent
i gives the J percentage of his own wealth Wi to the
agent j and in exchange receives the same J percent-
age of the jth agent’s wealth Wj . This means that in
any trade between rich and poor, the poor will always
receive an unrealistically large amount of wealth from
the rich, and this amount of wealth would increase if the
trader is richer even for the cheapest commodity trans-
ferred. Moreover, in the absence of the multiplicative
process, the mean-field approximation causes the wealth
of all economic agents to exponentially converge toward
the mean wealth W . In fact, the solution of Eq. (4)
without the multiplicative process is
Wi(t) = W + (Wi(0)−W ) exp[−J t], (5)
implying that the trade dynamics has the asymptotic ef-
fect of “equalizing” the wealth among all members of the
society. Therefore, in the absence of investments, there
would be neither rich nor poor! Moreover, even disre-
garding the mean-field approximation, the linear trade
component of Eq. (3) presents the further difficulty of
implying that in a trade involving any type of commod-
ity between the same ith and jth agents, the amount of
wealth moving from one agent to the other is related to
the wealth of both traders and that the linear exchange
rates Jij and Jji are fixed.
There also exists a statistical equilibrium theory of
markets built on the Maxwell-Boltzmann-Gibbs statis-
tical mechanics and kinetic theory that try to han-
dle the intrinsic stochasticity of the trade phenomenon
[2, 3, 12, 13, 33]. The kinetic theory approximation as-
sumes that the transfer of wealth between traders is sim-
ilar to the interchange of energy in random elastic colli-
sions between particles and, therefore, yields an equilib-
rium wealth distribution given by a Maxwell-Boltzmann
exponential distribution for wealth p(w) ∝ e−w/T , where
T is the “temperature” of the market. According to such
an analogy, in a trade transaction the total wealth-energy
(or a fraction of it according to the reaction scheme
[Wi,Wj ]→ [γWi+ ε(1− γ)(Wi+Wj), γWj +(1− ε)(1−
γ)(Wi +Wj)], [33]) of both traders should mix and then
be randomly split between the two traders. More recently
it was also suggested a kinetic model of market with ran-
dom saving propensity that yields to a fixed Pareto index
µ = 1 [34].
The kinetic theory approach also presents problems.
In fact, Maxwell-Boltzmann-Gibbs statistical mechanics
requires the assumption of “equal likelihood” that neces-
sitates the assumption of “absence of information” [3, 35].
These assumptions are problematic in real trades because
when rich and poor interact, for example, both agents
are (usually) well aware of their reciprocal social status.
This reciprocal knowledge, in addition to the higher in-
terest that the poor have in trying to save money or to
get more money when they trade with the rich, should
constitute the added “information” that makes all pos-
sible price negotiation outcomes between rich and poor
“not” equally likely. The actual distribution of prices is
out-of-equilibrium compared to that based on the equal
likelihood assumption of prices [3] because the informa-
tion that the traders have about their reciprocal social
status makes the actual distribution of prices stochasti-
cally biased or skewed in favor of the poor regardless of
whether the poorer is the seller or the buyer. Moreover,
because the kinetic theory assumes that all outputs of
the interaction are equally likely, being the conservation
of the sum of the two energy-wealths the only constraint,
the poor would have an extraordinary chance to signifi-
cantly increase their wealth when trading with the rich.
Finally, the empirical distributions of wealth or income
are not monotonic, they increase, reach a maximum and,
finally, decrease as an exponential function first and then
asymptotically as an inverse power-law function, see Fig
1. Therefore, the empirical distribution of wealth or in-
come can not be recovered by the monotonically decreas-
ing exponential distribution of Maxwell and Boltzmann
that, at most, is capable of fitting only the middle range
of wealth or income distributions [13].
III. A NONLINEAR STOCHASTIC
TRADE-INVESTMENT MODEL
Linear models have unrealistic trade interactions be-
cause they do not preserve certain important properties
of actual trades. We suggest that Eq. (3) be replaced
with a nonlinear model that preserves the main proper-
ties of a trade mechanism [36]. A trade model has to take
into account the role played by prices in mediating ex-
change; how prices emerge from ideal negotiations among
agents that may belong to different social classes; and fi-
nally, how prices are related to the values of the assets
that can be associated only with the wealth of the poorer
trader. In addition, the model should generate a theoret-
ical distribution of wealth to be compared with empirical
data over the entire available range, not just the upper-
most bracket where the IPL prevails or the middle range
where an exponential behavior seems to prevail [12].
To incorporate these properties of trade we suggest
that in the basic trade-investment model the ith agent’s
wealth Wi(t) evolves in time according to the discrete
nonlinear stochastic equation
Wi(t+ 1) = Wi(t) + riξ(t)Wi(t) +
N∑
j=1( 6=i)
wij(t). (6)
In this model the investment term is still a multiplica-
tive stochastic process with Gaussian statistics, as in the
Bouchaud-Mezard model. For convenience, the invest-
ment term is here rewritten as riξ (t)Wi (t) where ri, the
standard deviation of the Gaussian variable riξ (t), will
be called the individual investment index. The new ele-
ment is the quantity wij(t), a nonlinear stochastic vari-
able that may change for each transaction and which de-
5scribes the actual amount of wealth that is exchanged
between the agents i and j in a trade. The specification
of the trade interaction term in the nonlinear stochastic
model requires great care. We observe that our model
has only the purpose of explaining the phenomenon in
broad outline not in minute details; therefore, the inter-
pretation is quite abstract, but we believe realistic.
In a trade there is a flow of wealth between the two
agents only if, in the case of barter, the value of the two
exchanged assets is different, or, in the case of purchase,
the value of the asset is different from the price paid for
it. By expressing these concepts in an equation, if the
trader i is the seller and the trader j is the buyer, the
quantity wij is given by
wij = price− value , (7)
instead, if the trader i is the buyer and the trader j is
the seller, the quantity wij is
wij = value− price . (8)
If price and value coincide, the trade would produce only
a transfer of items and money among the agents, but
there would not be any transfer of wealth. If the seller
(buyer) succeeds in selling (buying) an item for a price
that is higher (lower) than the actual value of the item,
the seller (buyer) gains wealth from the buyer (seller).
Therefore, we may say that it is the dynamics of mak-
ing good or bad deals, in a generalized sense, that con-
tinuously generates the random flux of wealth from one
trader to the other in every transaction.
We observe that the above wealth transfer mechanism
favors one trader and not the other and should not be
confused with the fact that trades occur only if it yields
some advantage to both traders. Without an increase in
utility for both traders, the parties would simply refuse
to trade. These reciprocal trade advantages are related
to the subjective fact that each trader gets what (money
or assets) he or she needs and wants more at the occur-
rence of the trade, while the objective transfer of wealth
described by the Eqs. (7) and (8) is related to the dif-
ference between the price paid for and the value of the
asset. Also we observe that if we were interested in the
exchange of money instead of wealth, we can proceed
with the same above formalism but with value = 0.
According to Eqs. (7,8) at each update of the economy
a random amount of wealth wij is positive (negative)
if the ith agent is gaining (losing) wealth in the trade.
Consequently, wij = −wji and a typical trade interaction
is assumed to follow the scheme
[Wi,Wj ]→ [Wi + wij ,Wj + wji] (9)
where the antisymmetric character of the wij insures that
in a trade transaction the total wealth is conserved. Con-
versely, wealth may be created or destroyed only by in-
vestment.
The elements wij are assumed for simplicity to be
Gaussian random variables with probability density
p (wij) =
1
σij
√
2pi
exp
[
− (wij − wij)
2
2σ2ij
]
(10)
where wij is a potential mean wealth that can be trans-
ferred between agents i and j and
σij = hWij (11)
is the standard deviation of wij . The standard deviation
of wij (11) is assumed to depend on the variable
Wij = Wji = min [Wi,Wj ] (12)
which implements the assumption that, in a realistic
trade, the fluctuation of wealth involved in a transac-
tion must be a proper fraction (0 ≤ h ≤ 1) of the wealth
of the poorer trader. In fact, an individual cannot (usu-
ally) buy or sell something that involves an amount of
wealth larger than his own total wealth. Since the stan-
dard deviation of the random variable, that is, the risk
incurred in a trade interaction, is proportional to h, the
latter could be interpreted as a poverty index, in that in
a poorer society a greater fraction of one’s wealth would
be at stake in a typical trade. One should also note that
the value of σij depends on the current status of Wi and
Wj at each update.
The variable wij of Eqs. (7,8) is stochastic because
both the price and the value of an item may fluctu-
ate. However, we observe that the value of an item
may change only in time because, as explained above,
the value is characterized by an agreement that involves
the entire society and evolves in time according to an in-
vestment mechanism. The price of an item, on the other
hand, may change not only in time but it may be dis-
persed in space because of its local characterization of
being an outcome of a negotiation that involves only the
two actual traders. For example, the price of an item
may be different at different locations within the same
society at a given time. An explicit model would have
this spatial effect included in several dynamic equations
depending on several variables. Herein, instead, we imag-
ine that this spatial dependence of the price is described
by a unique nonlinear stochastic variable. Therefore, the
variable wij of Eq. (7) is intrinsically stochastic in na-
ture and can be associated, for example, with a distribu-
tion like Eq. (10) and not with a uniquely defined price.
These assumptions of the NSTIM are incompatible with
the “Law of one price” [4], which is a standard assump-
tion in neoclassical economic models (including Pareto’s
[37]) that attempt to dynamically address the problem.
On the other hand these assumptions are compatible with
the Classical school of thought.
To complete the model we need to specify the value of
the mean wealth wij to be used in Eq. (10). A value
wij = 0 would imply a statistical equilibrium in which
both traders have the same chance to make a good or bad
6deal. However, as we have explained in the introduction,
the mean wealth wij should not be zero because of the
many social and political forces influencing economies.
The mean wealth wij is related to a kind of social dif-
ferentiation among the members of a society because the
rich and the poor trade in different ways and this keeps
the trade in an out-of-equilibrium state. We assume that
the poor are constrained by their poverty to be more
careful in their trades and therefore, for example, they
may often look for the best price opportunity for saving
money. On the other hand, because of their economic
strength, the rich may be willing to purchase items re-
gardless of cost. This is a realistic assumption in partic-
ular when the value of an item is low compared with the
total wealth of the trader, that is, for example when a
wealthy agent would like to buy something from a poorer
agent. Of course, if the wealth involved in a trade is com-
patible with the agent’s wealth, he or she is expected to
be more prudent. In other words, a trade can take place
only if the two agents, through a negotiation, reach an
agreement about the price of the asset. The trade trans-
action has a higher probability to occur if the price is
below a threshold at which the buyer is willing to buy.
Because this threshold increases with the total wealth of
an agent, when a wealthy agent would like to buy some-
thing from a poorer agent there is a higher probability
that the transaction occurs at a higher price than when
a wealthy agent would like to sell the same item to a
poorer agent. This asymmetric disadvantage-advantage
tends to disappear when the two traders are economically
equivalently.
In conclusion, in the NSTIM the volume of wealth in-
volved in a trade between two agents is related to the
wealth of the poorer of the two traders, so we assume
that wij is related to the value σij . In this way wij is of
the same magnitude as the amount of wealth involved in
the trade, and it is related to the total wealth of the two
traders through the nonlinear expression
wij = αij h Wij . (13)
The variable αij is given, for example, by the nonlinear
term that measures the out-of-equilibrium status of the
trade,
αij = f
Wj −Wi
Wi +Wj
. (14)
The quantity f > 0 is called the social equality index, and
measure the strength of the bias in favor of the poorer
trader. In fact, according to Eqs. (10) and (14), if the
wealths Wi and Wj of the two traders are almost the
same, then αij ≈ 0 and both traders have an equal
chance of gaining or losing wealth. If, instead, for ex-
ample, Wj ≫ Wi, we have αij ≈ f , the distribution
p(wij) (10) is out-of-equilibrium, that is, shifted toward
positive values and the trader i, the poorer trader, has
a better chance to gain wealth in the trade. We stress
that with this mechanism, in trading with the rich the
poor can have only a realistic “better chance” to improve
their own wealth by an amount related to their own re-
stricted resources, and not, as the mean field and kinetic
theory approximations would imply, have the possibility
of gaining an unreasonably large amount of wealth from
the rich.
IV. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
We study the properties of NSTIM numerically and
initiate all simulations by assuming an ideal society con-
sisting of 105 agents, with wealth uniformly distributed
among them.
The first case we examine is with h > 0, f = 0 and
r = 0, that is, we assume a symmetric trade-alone econ-
omy where wij = 0 in (10) for all j and i. Such a
choice implies that in any trade each amount of trans-
ferred wealth is equally likely to be gained or lost by any
given agent. The simulation shows that under such condi-
tions, the available wealth is rapidly concentrated in the
hands of a relatively few agents. Moreover the inequality
in the distribution of wealth increases with the number
of iterations, as shown in Figure 2. Such an outcome is
not surprising; in fact, if one interprets the standard de-
viation σij as the risk incurred in a trade by agents i and
j, it is clear that the poorer agent is taking a greater risk
in proportion to his/her wealth, with the disparity in-
creasing the greater the difference in wealth between the
traders. The dynamics of a system such as that repre-
sented by the symmetric trade-alone model are unstable,
in the sense that relative differences generally tend to be
further amplified. If we set the threshold of ‘economic
death’ at some finite level Wj > minimum, implying
that an agent with such little wealth cannot continue
to trade, the situation becomes completely analogous to
the classical problem of the gambler’s ruin [8]. Modern
societies generally avert such catastrophes [38], thereby
implying the unrealistic nature of trades in a statistical
equilibrium between rich and poor and suggesting the
need for a mechanism which would dampen differences
between rich and poor, rather than amplify them.
The second case we examine is with h > 0, f > 0 and
r = 0, The quantity f > 0 measures the bias in favor of
the poorer trader. This version of the trade-investment
model clearly implies that agent i has a greater chance to
draw a positive value for wij , representing a gain, if agent
i is poorer than agent j, and this chance increases with
increasing economic disparity. In Figure 3 we show the
resulting probability density functions for different values
of the social equality index f for a given value of h. The
distribution of wealth becomes narrower with increasing
f , meaning that the probability of being rich falls off
rapidly with increasing wealth. Therefore, the condensa-
tion of wealth is less pronunced in a society characterized
by a high value of the social equality index f that would
imply a higher chance for the poor to gain wealth from
the rich. Instead, Figure 4 shows that for a given value
7of f , increasing the poverty index h leads to greater eco-
nomic disparity and, therfore, to a higher condensation
of wealth. The interpretation is that in a poorer society,
and one based on trade alone, the potentially ruinous
effects of an unfavorable trading sequence are more pro-
nounced, and this will benefit the rich against the poor.
All simulations shown in Figures 3 and 4 are well-fit by
the Gamma-like distribution
p (w) = a (w − c)η exp [−dw] (15)
which clearly exhibits a non-monotonic behavior with an
exponential-like tail. In Table 1 we display the values
of the parameters utilized to fit the outcomes of dif-
ferent simulations. To summarize, the latter version of
the asymmetric or out-of-equilibrium trade-alone model
( h > 0 and f > 0, r = 0) appears more realistic than the
previous one with f = 0 in two respects: 1) it yields, at
least qualitatively, the emergence of a sizeable ‘middle-
class’ as opposed to an overwhelmingly rich elite and a
vast population of paupers as did the previous model;
2) it admits well-behaved stationary solutions, whereas
f = 0 would lead to an inexorable drift towards a singu-
larity; 3) the trade mechanisms gives origin to a Gamma
distribution that is what is observed for the low-middle
classes in phenomenological data, as Figure 1 shows. In
fact, the economy of the low-middle classes is presumably
characterized mostly by trades.
The third case we examine is with h > 0, f > 0 and
r > 0, which means we now examine the role played by
the multiplicative processes that describes investments in
the model economy. In Figure 5 we show the outcome
of simulations with both mechanisms, investment and
trade, simultaneously active. The curves highlight the
effect of investment by plotting three probability density
curves, one for each value of rj , for fixed values of f and
h. It appears that increasing r, all other things being
equal, leads to a broadening of the wealth distributions
and thus, to a greater economic disparity. The economic
interpretation is that greater disparities arise in a society
wherein one’s worth tends to fluctuate more, either be-
cause its members deliberately place more of their wealth
in riskier assets (investments with greater potential pay-
off engender more risk) or because the valuation of their
assets is intrinsically more erratic due, for example, to
uncertain times. As in the previous case, if we keep r
fixed, the model simulations show that the Pareto index
increases with increasing f and decreases with increasing
h.
The investment process is implemented in the simula-
tion by imposing that every 104 trades the wealth of all
agents is reinitialized by the multiplicative process. In
Figure 5 is visible a partial fit of the tail of one of the
computer-generated probability density functions with a
Pareto distribution x−δ, where µ = δ − 1 is the Pareto
exponent. It is evident from the figure that, as expected,
the inclusion of the multiplicative process term is capable
of generating distributions endowed with inverse power-
law tails. We find that the computer-generated probabil-
ity density functions may apparently be well-fitted over
the entire range by functions of the form
p (w) =
aδwγ
(1 + bw)
δ+γ
(16)
Table II records the fitting parameters for the two wealth
distributions denoted by triangles and stars in Figure 5.
The cumulative probability function, that is, the integral
of the probability density function depicted in Figure 5
by circles, is shown in Figure 6, along with an IPL fit for
the upper wealth region. In the inset is shown the fit of
the middle range of the same curve implemented with an
exponential function proving that the low-middle range
of the distribution can be also well fit with a Gamma
distribution. In fact, in some simulations the distribution
separation between the low-middle range and the upper
range emerge more clearly.
At this stage, one can conclude that the NTSTI
model (6), implemented with both investment and trade
mechanisms, and with the latter biased in favor of the
less wealthy agent, can successfully reproduce important
qualitative features observed in the real world, namely,
the stratification of society into a poor class, a large mid-
dle class and an affluent but very small upper class. A
trade-alone mechanism would be sufficient to get such a
stratification, it leads to a Gamma distribution as ob-
served in phenomenological data regarding the low and
middle classes, see Figure 1b. To obtain the observed
Pareto’s law, that is, an IPL tail for the uppermost class
it is necessary to include the investment mechanism.
V. COMPARISON OF CALCULATIONS WITH
DATA
In this section we assess the ability of the NSTIM to re-
produce quantitative details of empirical data, see Figure
1, as opposed to merely reproducing general qualitative
features of data. In a recent empirical study, Dra˘gulescu
and Yakovenko [12] conclude that the data pertaining
to the cumulative distribution of wealth in the United
Kingdom and income for the United States can be well
fitted by an exponential (Maxwell-Boltzmann) function
in the low-middle range, followed by an inverse power-law
(Pareto) tail in the high-end region, as we also obtained
from the preceding simulations. However, as these au-
thors show, such an exponential behavior cannot be cor-
rect over the entire domain of the data because the PDF
of wealth is not monotonic. Dra˘gulescu and Yakovenko
recognize that in the low-middle range the wealth PDF
has been well fitted by a Gamma distribution, as the
trade-investment model produces. In any case, it turns
out that a cumulative distribution of wealth has been
obtained by appeal to a variety of mechanisms. For ex-
ample, Huang and Solomon [39] ascribe the appearance
of such dual behavior in wealth distributions to the fact
that an idealized marketplace has a finite size; Souma
et al.[21] identify the source of these features with the
8rewiring of links in a small-world network [40] over which
a stochastic process is assumed to evolve and finally Mon-
troll and Shlesinger [41], in their discussion of income,
arrive at this result using renormalization group scaling
arguments and these arguments can be simply recast in
terms of wealth.
To understand why the distribution of wealth for the
rich is different from that of the rest of society, we ob-
serve that they rely on different economic instruments:
the rich mainly on investments and all the others mainly
on trades. This plausible statement has the virtue of em-
pirical evidence [42]. A simple way to incorporate this
dichotomy into the NSTIM is to subdivide the N agents
into two groups with different investment indices,
∆Wi = r1ξWi +
N∑
j=1( 6=i)
wij ; 1 ≤ i ≤ N1 (17)
∆Wi = r2ξWi +
N∑
j=1( 6=i)
wij ; N1 ≤ i ≤ N (18)
where N = N1 + N2 and r1 6= r2. Figure 7 shows two
cumulative distributions obtained with the parameters:
social equality index f = 0.3, poverty index h = 0.05 and
investment indices for 50% of the population r1 = 0.075
and 0.055, while r = 0 for the other half in both sim-
ulations. It is clearly visible in the figure that this ar-
tificial two-tiered subdivision of society accentuates the
distinction between an IPL tail region (about 1% of the
population) of the wealth distribution and another region
(about 99% of the population) with completely different
curvature that can be fitted with a cumulative gamma
distribution. Figure 7 shows that by choosing opportune
parameters of the model it is possible to fit phenomeno-
logical distributions quite well. In summary, the distri-
butions of wealth and income show an anomalous shape
well described by a Gamma distribution at low and mid-
dle wealth and a Pareto’s tail at high wealth, that is, with
a complex shape that may be approximately described by
Eqs. (1) and (2).
We interpret this result as a signal that such a duality
of economic mechanisms, pursued by different strata of
society, may indeed be responsible for the observed dual
behavior of empirical curves. The Pareto exponents of
the two fitting curves in Figure 7a are, respectively, α =
1.5 ± 0.02 and 2.5 ± 0.02, which straddle the empirical
values as those shown in figure 1a (α = 1.85) about UK
[12] and those shown in figure 7b about the cumulative
distributions in USA during 1980 (α = 2.2) and 1989
(α = 1.63). Furthermore, increasing r for the investment-
prone part of society leads to smaller Pareto exponents,
as expected, and thus to greater economic disparity.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Naturally, it would be an arduous task to measure
the values of the fundamental parameters r, h and f
of the NSTIM model in real economic situations. The
actual values of these parameters are expected to fluc-
tuate around average values and they may assume arbi-
trarily complicated functional forms to account for vary-
ing structures of society’s trade and investment net-
works. Nevertheless, from a complex systems view-
point, a framework has been constructed wherein general
features observed in empirical wealth distributions can
be ascribed to specific activities that are known to be
present in society and, perhaps more importantly, tests
can be run on the social impact of variations, which are
known to occur, of specific economic factors.
Phenomenological distributions of wealth show an
abrupt change between the low-middle classes (99% of
the population), where a Gamma distribution dominates,
and the uppermost class (1% of the population) where a
Pareto’s distribution dominates. We have shown that
the NSTIM model consistently interprets such behavior
as due to the fact that trade is the main mechanism
that characterizes the low and middle classes and this
produces a Gamma distribution of wealth, whereas in-
vestment, is the main mechanism that influences the up-
permost class individuals who own the means of large
production. The trade mechanism depends on two pa-
rameters: a poverty index h, and a social equality in-
dex f . We saw that by increasing h or decreasing f
wealth condenses more easily. The investment process
can be modelled with a multiplicative stochastic mech-
anism whose strength is measured by the parameter r
and generates a Pareto’s law. By incresing the parame-
ter r wealth condenses more easily because the economy
of the low-middle classes remains mainly characterized
by trades even though some investment can be present
within these classes. Of course, the three parameters may
change in time and this explains why the Pareto index is
not constant but evolves [11] as Fig. 7b shows.
As a simple interpretative application of the model,
herein we attempt an explanation of a sociological phe-
nomenon that is easily observed in history and that was
summarized by Pareto in the theory known as “the circu-
lation of the elites” [43] and in his criticism of the Marxist
revolutionary theory [44]. In fact, in poor societies where
modern means of production are for whatever reason ab-
sent, or simply insufficiently capable of producing surplus
value, revolutionaries usually think that alternate means
should be developed to redistribute wealth by force or by
deceit with the results of increasing the social equality in-
dex f . But the success of such policies would be doubtful.
In fact, a society without sufficient means of production
would be characterized by a high poverty index h that
statistically favors a small rich class in their trade with
the poor. On the other hand the social equality index
f can not be arbitrarily increased because too high an f
would excessively reduce the capital that is necessary for
production and would cause a further impoverishment of
the society. Moreover, the ensuing insecurity of a rev-
olution would be reflected by a concomitant increase of
the volatility parameter r, which would again favor a
9small upper class. Therefore, the NSTIM model seems
to confirm the realistic expectation that without consis-
tent economic development, which reduces the poverty
index h that contrasts the wealth condensation, a rev-
olution would simply have, at most, the asymptotic ef-
fect of supplanting one ruling elite with another because
there would not be a significant redistribution of wealth,
despite Marxist promises to the contrary [44].
Finally, we owe the reader a wider discussion about
the wisdom of opting for a model of trade that favors the
poor against the rich, even if such a bias is only statisti-
cal. Without such a bias the rich would get richer and the
poor would get poorer over time. The mechanism that
in a trade favors the poorer of the two agents is possible
because in a real economy, contrary to an assumption of
the Neoclassical school of economics, price and value of
a commodity do not coincide: this is what generates the
transfer of wealth from one trader to another according
to Eqs. (7) and (8). The price dispersion is contingent on
the trade phenomenon itself and not simply a transition
to an equilibrium price as the “Law of one price” would
suggest [4]. In fact, the price dispersion is produced by
different possible outcomes of economic negotiations be-
tween pairs of traders and it is associated with several
factors, among them the most important being the eco-
nomic differentiation among the social classes yielding a
price discrimination mechanism [45] and, therefore a di-
vergence between price and value, the latter defined as
the equilibrium price.
The social differentiation induces asymmetric behav-
iors that yield statistically opposite outcomes when two
agents, belonging to different social classes, negotiate a
transaction; for example, the poor try to sell their ser-
vices and products at the highest prices and purchase at
the lowest prices. By including such a mechanism, the
nonlinear stochastic trade model takes into account the
importance of the role of prices in mediating exchange
and redistributing wealth among members of the society.
NSTIM also takes into account how the price emerges
from a negotiation mechanism whose stochastic outcome
can be only a fraction of the wealth of the poorer party
and can not be related to the richer trader’s wealth. This
is because a trader cannot (usually) afford to buy or sell
a commodity whose value is larger than his/her own total
wealth. Instead, the probability of making a “good deal”
depends nonlinearly on the wealth of the two traders and
is statistically biased in favor of the poorer agent. In fact,
the richer party is less risk averse when bargaining over a
given amount, than is the poorer party. This means that
the poorer party should be a stronger bargainer than the
rich to get the better of the deal.
In particular, in real societies the main trade trans-
actions are those taking place between citizens and the
state through the tax system, and between employers
and employees. It is easy to realize that these processes
are statistically biased in favor of the poor and play a
significant role in redistributing wealth. The graduated
income tax requires that the rich pay a higher percentage
of taxes than do the poor. There are also luxury taxes
for products that only the rich can afford to buy. On
the contrary, there are several tax reductions for prod-
ucts necessary to everybody such as, for example, food
staples. These mechanisms are devices deliberately put
in place to ameliorate the economic gap between rich and
poor. In fact, the tax system can be interpreted as a trade
through which the citizens buy services from the state.
Because the services granted by the state are expected
to be proportional to a citizen’s wealth, the graduated
tax system has the effect of discriminating among the
citizens, forcing the wealthy class to pay a higher price
for services than that paid by the less wealthy. About
the relation between employers and employees, we notice
that every time Marx spoke of the relationship between
the wage and the value of labor-power, he used the term
“minimum wage” [14, 15, 16], thus emphasizing that in
practice he expected the wage to exceed this minimum
and hence there to be a price-value divergence in favor
of the working class at the expense of capitalists. These
effects can be incorporated into the social equality index
f of Eq. (14) that measures the statistical bias of the
trade in favor of the poor.
We observe that according to the perspective of the
Neoclassical school of economics, the out-of-equilibrium
concept that wage is different from the value of labor
makes no sense. The Neoclassical model of the labor mar-
ket presumes that the wage equals the marginal product
of labor (see Keen 2002 Ch. 5 [6]), and wage value and
wage price therefore coincide. However, from a Classical
point of view, the concept is quite different. The Classi-
cal school defined the value of any commodity as its cost
of production, and the cost of production of the com-
modity labor is therefore the means of subsistence. Our
finding that trade is stochastically biased in favor of the
poor is consistent with the fact that the wage price can
be systematically higher than the means of subsistence
and, therefore, the workers receive more than a subsis-
tence wage. This empirical conclusion is not inconsis-
tent with a Neoclassical perspective on the relationship
between the actual wage and the means of subsistence,
since in the Neoclassical theory there is no relationship
between the marginal product of labor and a subsistence
level of income. But the conclusion that there is a trans-
fer of wealth from rich (employers) to poor (workers) via
worker-biased wages is inconsistent with the vision of the
labor market (and, therefore, all other markets) being in
equilibrium.
In conclusion, we believe that the most important
theoretical aspect of our findings is that our study al-
lows us to compare two rival economic theories (Clas-
sical against Neoclassical) of price and wealth distribu-
tion, and seems to come down on the side of the Classical
School concerning the importance of the role played by
price/value divergence. This divergence is alien to Neo-
classical economics, which has melded price and value
into one thing. Neoclassical analysis is predicated upon
equilibrium, and in equilibrium price equals value, and
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no transfer of wealth is possible in trades. The preceding
Classical School did have a theory in which market price
could and normally did differ from value as seems phe-
nomenologically evident. The Classical School defined
value effectively as the cost of production of a commod-
ity; the price was what it sold for on the market. They ex-
pected price/value divergences to occur all the time and
that, therefore, out-of-equilibrium trades were possible.
Our findings stress the importance of out-of-equilibrium
mechanisms that bias the trade transactions in favor of
the poor because they are not only possible but they seem
necessary to stabilize society by avoiding the economic
catastrophe whereby the entire wealth concentrates in
the hands of very few rich people.
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a d c η
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FIG. 1: [a] Cumulative wealth (1996) and income (1998-1999) distributions in United Kingdom; the upper class (almost 1% of
the population) the distribution is well fit with a Pareto’s law. [b] Income distribution (2001) in USA; the low-middle classes
(almost 99% of the population), the distribution is well fit with a Gamma distribution, Eq. (15).
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FIG. 3: Wealth probability density for the asymmetric trade-alone model with a fixed poverty index h = 0.05. The wealth
condensation increases by decreasing the social index f . The investment index is r = 0. The distributions are fitted by a
Gamma distribution Eq. (15). The fitting parameters are in Table I. The wealth is in units of the poorest agent’s wealth.
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FIG. 4: Wealth probability density for the asymmetric trade-alone model with a fixed social index f = 0.2. The wealth
condensation increases by increasing the poverty index h. The distributions are compared to an exponential Maxwell-Boltzmann
distribution. The wealth is in units of the poorest agent’s wealth.
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FIG. 5: Trade-investment economy. The social and poverty index are fixed; f = 0.3 and h = 0.05. The probability distributions
(tringles) and (stars) are fitted by using Eq. (16). The fitting parameters are in Table II. The tail of the probability distribution
(circles) is fitted by a power law of the type 1/xµ+1 where µ = 1.5 in the Pareto’s exponent. The small picture shows the
probability distribution (circles) in the interval [10:100] that can be apparently fitted with an exponential Maxwell-Boltzmann
distribution but not at low values of w. The wealth is measured in units of the poorest agent’s wealth.
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FIG. 6: Cumulative probability for an trade-investment economy with h = 0.05, f = 0.3 and r = 0.075. The Pareto’s exponent
is µ = 1.5 ± 0.02. The little picture shows that in the interval [10:100] the P(w) can be apparently fitted by an exponential
Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution. The wealth is measured in units of the poorest agent’s wealth.
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FIG. 7: [a] Cumulative probability for a double trade-investment economy. One half of the population has the investment index
r2 = 0, the other half of the population has in one case r1 = 0.075 and in the other r1 = 0.055. In both cases the social index
is f = 0.3 and the poverty index is h = 0.05. The Pareto’s exponents are µ = 1.5± 0.02 and µ = 2.5± 0.02. While 99% of the
population follow a cumulative Gamma distribution and 1% of the population follow a Pareto law. The wealth is measured in
units of the poorest agent’s wealth. [b] Cumulative income distributions in USA during 1980 and 1989.
